Obligation to obey the law
Obligation to obey the law
In assessing the significance of scepticism, one needs to bear in mind several points: Scepticism about political obligation flows from the special features of legal authority, in particular, its wide scope, its institutionalized character, and its moral fallibility. There are weaker forms of voluntarism. Bulloch and J. Smith, M. Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 2nd Ser. Anscombe refers to the right to have what is necessary for the role, but what is that? People choose their friends, but not in order to have obligations to them. Jeremy Waldron diagnoses the force of such counterexamples as deriving from the fact that, although operating justly, the Institute is not something whose activities are required by justice: they are optional, not necessary Waldron Most sceptical arguments are about over-reach. This is not to deny that we owe something to those decent associations of which we find ourselves non-voluntary members—but we do need some further argument to determine exactly what this amounts to. That suggests that NJT covers only a narrow range of legitimate state activity.
And there is the matter of validity: what makes these requirements binding on its occupants? Wasserstrom, R.
Natural Law and Natural Rights. The Authority of Law. People choose their friends, but not in order to have obligations to them.
Walker, A. Beran, H.
Is there a duty to obey the law pdf
Preview Unable to display preview. First, there is the view that there is an absolute legal obligation to obey the law, one which holds that we ought always to obey the law no matter what because the law is the law and it ought always to be obeyed. Raz, eds. NJT is governed by whatever reasons correctly apply to the case, not reasons of which the agent is aware, or which serve his self-interest narrowly understood. London: Routledge. In political authority, where the stakes are as high as they come, the power to give and withhold consent serves an ultimate protective function beyond what we could expect from the fallible institutions of limited government. Others are more extravagant. M Friendship provides an analogy. Locke argues that one cannot consent to be killed, and thus not to slavery, and thus not to anything tantamount to slavery, including absolute government. So necessitarian arguments leave unsupported some—possibly a lot—of valuable state action. To put it another way, law itself purports to determine how far and in what contexts its authority binds. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Jeremy Waldron diagnoses the force of such counterexamples as deriving from the fact that, although operating justly, the Institute is not something whose activities are required by justice: they are optional, not necessary Waldron
Third, though consent is defined by its performative character, ancillary non-performative features naturally accompany it: consent also expresses the acceptability, or at least tolerability, of the government.
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